On October 7th, the Foundation hosted an event entitled “Hard Cases: The Proliferation Challenge in India, Iran, and North Korea.” The discussion was lead by two experts in the field of nonproliferation and foreign policy. Joseph Cirincione is the director for Non-Proliferation at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a professor at the Georgetown University Graduate School of Foreign Service. Daniel Poneman is currently a Principal of the Scowcroft Group, an international business advisory firm in Washington, DC. Previously, he served as Special Assistant to President Clinton and Senior Director for Nonproliferation and Export Controls at the National Security Council. During that time, he participated in negotiations and consultations with governments in Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America and the former Soviet Union.

Mr. Cirincione began the discussion by noting the “critical moment” in which the world currently lies regarding its nuclear challenge. He identified four tipping points. First and foremost are terrorists and their ability to secure enriched uranium. Secondly, a new group of states has emerged with nuclear capability. These states, such as North Korea and Iran reside in volatile regions of the world. Next, the fuel cycle and the ingredients that go into and come out of it can be manipulated to produce weapons grade ingredients, rather than peaceful ones. Lastly, the existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons pose a threat in case of transfer or accident.

Mr. Poneman spoke more specifically about the challenges in India, Iran, and North Korea. He suggested a cooperative fuel cycle innitiative to eliminate the proliferation risk posed by spent nuclear fuel while ensuring that countries safely meet their domestic energy needs. This “cradle to the grave” approach would ensure that countries lacking or plutonium reprocessing facilities could obtain cost-effective, guaranteed access to nuclear fuel as well as guaranteed removal of spent fuel waste in exchange for an agreement not to obtain enrichment facilities or related technology. Countries that possess enrichment facilities and fuel for nuclear reactors would provide life-time assurances to user states to provide them with fuel and removal of spent fuel. However, this kind of program would present several obstacles, including a country’s vulnerability in giving up so much control.

The response of staff and the surrounding community, the thought provoking presentations by our speakers, and the many questions that followed their remarks are all further indications of the importance of this topic. Both Mr. Poneman (Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis and Nuclear Power in the Developing World) and Mr. Cirincione (Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Threats and Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security) have made important contributions in this area.